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CHAPTER I 
PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION
Problem Statement
Montana law requires all employers to provide workers' 
compensation insurance. Employers have three options: they 
may self insure; they may purchase insurance from private 
carriers; or they may purchase insurance from a state 
insurance fund. In Montana and elsewhere, the state funds 
are insurers of last resort for employers; they provide 
insurance for employers who cannot procure insurance through 
the private market.
The state fund approach is not the only method to 
guarantee availability of workers' compensation insurance to 
all employers; there is also the state Assigned Risk Plan 
(ARP) approach. The ARP mandates that all insurers of 
workers compensation participate equitably in insuring "poor 
risks." A common formula for participation is based on the 
total percentage of voluntary premiums a firm writes. For 
example, if an insurance carrier writes 15% of the workers' 
compensation voluntary premiums in a state for a year, the 
insurance carrier would participate in 15% of the gains or 
losses of the "poor risks" who are insured through the ARP.
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Thirty-five states use an ARP mechanism to provide workers' 
compensation insurance to employers who cannot purchase 
insurance in the voluntary market.
In 1989 the Montana Legislature through Senate Bill 428 
authorized the establishment of an assigned risk program for 
the state of Montana. The primary question is, "How big 
will this assigned risk category be?" The answer to this 
question is the focus of this paper.
The primary objectives of this research are to: 1) 
describe the existing elements of ARPs, 2) review states 
which use an ARP and 3) analyze published data from these 
states with existing ARPs to verify factors which could 
explain the size of their assigned risk pool.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ASSIGNED RISK PLAN OR RESIDUAL MARKET COMPONENTS
Definition of Residual Market
State laws mandate employers, henceforth called 
insureds or risks, to provide workers' compensation 
insurance. To guarantee coverage, workers' compensation has 
an insurance market of last resort known as a residual 
market. The residual market is an involuntary market for 
risks who are unable to purchase workers' compensation in 
the voluntary market. Coverage becomes difficult because of 
the nature of their business or loss experience. The 
residual market is a solution to availability and 
affordability problems which plague other commercial 
insurance lines. (Huber 1986). The workers' compensation 
voluntary insurance market consists of private insurance 
companies and competitive state funds.
The two primary mechanisms for providing a residual 
workers' compensation market are the state Assigned Risk 
Plan (ARP) and the state fund approach. The most common 
approach, the state ARP, is commonly referred to as the 
Workers' Compensation Insurance Plan ("WCIP" or "Plans").
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Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia utilize 
the WCIP approach. The WCIPs are similar but not uniform 
among the states. WCIPs or ARPs require each insurer to 
accept a number of "bad risks" proportional to the volume of 
workers' compensation business transacted in the voluntary 
market in a given state.
The National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) 
whose primary function is the rate-making body for the 
workers' compensation industry is the principal 
administrator of WCIPs. Table 1 outlines the breakdown of 
states utilizing the WCIP or ARP approach.
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Table 1
Summary of State Assigned Risk Plans or 
Workers' Compensation Insurance Plans (WCIP)
NCCI-Initiated Plans*
Alabama
Arizona
Connecticut
Florida
Georgia
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Mississippi 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
New Hampshire
Rhode Island 
South Dakota 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Vermont
Dist. of Columbia
Statutory Plans, Administered by the NCCI
Alaska
Arkansas
Illinois 
New Mexico
Independent Plans Following NCCI Plan Procedures*
Delaware
Hawaii
Indiana
Massachusetts 
Michigan 
New Jersey
Independent Statutory Plans
Minnesota Texas
North Carolina
Oregon
Virginia
Wisconsin
♦Indicates plans reinsured by the National Pool
Source: Compiled by National Council on Compensation
Insurance (NCCI)
Workers' Compensation Insurance Plans and Reinsurance Pools 
—  an overview.
In 1970, NCCI sponsored the formation of the National 
Workers' Compensation Reinsurance Pool (NWCRP, "National 
Pool" or "Pool") which reinsures and administers the WCIPs
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(Eisenberg & Vieweg, 1987). The concept of reinsurance is 
used by insurers to share equitably in the p ool's gains or 
losses in a given year. Reinsurance shifts part or all of 
the insurance written by one insurer to another insurer or 
members of a pool (Rejda, 1986). The pool is backed by the 
full financial resources of the entire industry. The pool 
guarantees that a distressed buyer can comply with the law. 
The pool offers state workers' compensation insurance 
regulators insurance availability, quality reinsurance, and 
uninterrupted benefits for the injured worker (Huber 86).
State funds originated as insurers of last resort. 
Twelve states have competitive state funds, however three of 
these states also have WCIPs. Competitive state funds 
compete with insurance companies in the voluntary market and 
serve as the insurer of last resort for employers unable to 
obtain coverage in the voluntary market (Eisenber & Vieweg, 
1987). The residual market is handled through the 
competitive state fund, except for the three states,
Arizona, Michigan, and Oregon, where the state fund shares 
the "bad risks" through an ARP. Six states utilize a 
monopolistic state fund. A monopolistic state fund writes 
all the workers* compensation for the state. Table 2 
outlines states utilizing competitive and monopolistic 
funds.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Administration of Assigned Risk Plans through NCCI
Because NCCI directly administers 2 4 of the 3 5 state 
ARPs and nine independent state plans follow the NCCI plan 
procedures, the ARP components will be examined through NCCI 
procedures.
Table 2
summary of Competitive and Monopolistic Funds 
Competitive State Funds
Arizona Maryland Oklahoma
California Michigan Oregon
Colorado Montana Pennsylvania
Idaho New York Utah
Monopolistic Funds
Nevada Ohio West Virginia
North Dakota Washington Wyoming
Note: Underlined states also have WCIPs
Source: NCCI Workers' Compensation Insurance Plans and
Reinsurance Pools— an Overview.
The ARP is administered through the NCCI National Pool.
Each state's ARP is independent, and gains and losses for a 
particular state are prorated among the workers' 
compensation insurers operating in that state (Gustavson & 
Trieschmann, 1985). Membership in the state's ARP is 
mandated by individual state plans. The membership in the 
National Pool is voluntary. The National Pool operates as a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
non-profit, unincorporated association of insurers licensed 
to write workers' compensation. Members of the National 
Pool limit their liability of assigned risks by sharing 
costs of assigned risk's expenses, losses, and gains 
(Eisenber & Vieweg, 1987).
Assigned Risk insurer's Compensation
The actual policies for employers insured by ARPs are 
processed by a servicing carrier. Under the ARP 
arrangement, the National Pool chooses between five and 12 
members to act as servicing carriers in the state. The 
servicing carrier is allotted an administrative expense 
(usually 30 percent of the premium). The carrier's 
administrative allowance is based on total written premiums, 
including surcharges less the producer's fee. ARPs offer a 
variety of producer fee schedules for agent's commissions. 
Agents' commissions vary between a flat percentage approach 
and a graduated scale. The small number of servicing 
carriers streamlines assignments and simplifies management 
for ARPs. Each servicing carrier remits the total premiums 
on all risks assigned to the National Pool. The servicing 
carrier pays all losses and reports all claims to the 
National Pool. The servicing carrier is reimbursed loss 
payments quarterly. The Pool shares operating results 
(gains and losses) of the assigned risks in proportion to 
its participation to direct premiums written in the 
voluntary workers' compensation market of that state
8
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(Eisenber & Vieweg, 1987, and Gustavson & Trieschmann,
1985). If the National Pool membership represents carriers 
who write 90% of the voluntary workers' compensation premium 
dollars in a given state, the Pool will share in 90% of the 
gains or losses from the ARP. The distribution of the gains 
and losses will be proportional to the carrier's market 
share in the voluntary market for that state. Carriers who 
are not members of the Pool are obligated to their portion 
of gains and losses under the ARP. The Pool is simply a 
reinsurance provider for insurers of workers* compensation. 
Eligibility for Assigned Risk Plan
Eligibility for an assigned risk pool is made after the 
employer has demonstrated an inability to obtain coverage in 
the voluntary market. The number of rejections required for 
eligibility varies. Most states require two rejections, 
however rejection minimums range from non specific to four. 
Coverage
To determine when coverage begins, states use two basic 
approaches. In one approach the ARP area office must 
receive a completed application before assignment of a 
servicing carrier is made. Coverage will typically bind at 
12:01 a.m. on the first day following the postmark time and 
date on the envelope of the application. In the second 
approach the binding coverage goes into effect no earlier 
than 12:01 of the first day following receipt of the premium 
deposit made with the servicing carrier. This approach
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
produces a later effective date. Most states bind coverage 
with the application receipt to the ARP area office. 
Coverage for Owners, Partners, and Officers
The rules governing availability of workers’ 
compensation coverage for owners and corporate officers are 
different between states. Most states (78%) allow owners 
and partners elective coverage or coverage which may be 
rejected. Few states (19-22%) disallow owner/officer 
coverage. Table 3 outlines coverage requirements for 
proprietors, partners and officers by state (Gustavson & 
Trieschmann, 1985).
10
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Table 3
Coverage for Proprietors, Partners and Executives 
I. Proprietors and Partners
Not covered but Not covered and may Covered butMav elect coverace not elect coverace mav reiect
Alabama Minnesota* Alaska Louisiana
Arizona (prtnrs) Mississippi Dist. of Columbia
Arkansas Missouri Iowa
Connect i cut Nebraska Massachusetts
Delaware New Hampshire Michigan (sole prop)
Florida New Mexico New Jersey
Georgia* North Carolina Rhode Island
Hawaii Oregon Vermont
Illinois South Carolina
Indiana South Dakota
Kansas Tennessee
Kentucky Texas*
Maine Virginia*
Mi chigan (ptnrs Wisconsin
& spouses)
II. Corporate Officers
Covered and may Not coveredCovered but mav reiect not reiect but mav elect
Alabama Maine* Dist. of Columbia Oregon
Alaska* Michigan* Delaware Texas
Arizona Mississippi Indiana
Arkansas Nebraska Massachusetts
Connecticut New Mexico Minnesota*
Florida North Carolina New Hampshire (if more
Georgia Rhode Island than 3 executives)
Hawaii South Carolina New Jersey
Illinois* South Dakota*
Iowa Tennessee
Kansas* Vermont
Kentucky Virginia*
Louisiana* Wisconsin
*Certain exceptions exist
Source: CPCU Journal, March 1985, p. 28.
11
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Cancellation Notice
If an employer is no longer entitled to insurance, does 
not comply with reasonable safety requirements, or violates 
policy terms, the insurance agent must have prior knowledge 
of policy cancellation procedures and effective dates. 
Cancellation notice requirements vary between 10-day and 3 0- 
day notification periods. Servicing carriers must also give 
notice and reasons for cancellation to the appropriate state 
agency in the state in which the cancellation is to take 
effect (Gustavson & Trieschmann, 1985).
Size of Residual Market and Profile of Participants
Since 1984 the residual market in workers' compensation 
has increased six fold. White, Eisenberg, and Vieweg 
contend that the assigned risk population is an indicator of 
the inadequacy of the rates for workers' compensation 
coverage. The 1989 Issues Report predicts when 1988 data is 
finalized, the residual market will reach an all-time high 
of 19.3 percent of the total workers' compensation market 
for 1988. Table 4 recaps the residual market share from 
1974 through 1988. Preliminary 1988 data in the 1989 Issues 
Report show total premium amounts in the residual market has 
grown 549 percent from 1984 through 1988. According to 
White, Eisenberg, and Vieweg, this signals the residual 
market line is in trouble and must look to pricing 
mechanisms to regain market sufficiency to drive the
12
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residual market share down. The residual market is no 
longer serving exclusively as a market of last resort.
The typical profile for an insured of the ARP 
represents one of the three following business environments
1) A business with a disproportionate administrative 
workers' compensation expense associated with small 
premiums. (Typical businesses include Professional & 
Clerical, Barber Shops.)
2) A business with high hazards associated with small 
premiums. (A unique business such as chemical labs, 
toxic waste, asbestos.)
3) A business with a high frequency of losses or 
accidents. (Restaurant and Nursing Homes employees 
have a high frequency of back related injuries (Huber,
1986.))
Table 4
RESIDUAL MARKET SHARE POOL PREMIUM AS A PERCENTAGE OF DIRECT
WRITTEN PREMIUM
20.0% T
18.0% ■
16.0% -■
14.0%
12.0%  ■
c 10.0%
8.0%
6.0%
4.0% -
2.0%
18.7% !9.3r.
,1.8% I H !  12.0%
74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88
Years
Source: NCCI Digest July 1988. Volume III. Issue II
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Because there has been only modest growth in the number 
of employers/employees in the work environment, the huge 
growth in the residual market represents a massive transfer 
of the voluntary market to the involuntary market. The 
swelling ARP and Pools characterize an insurance industry 
effort to protect individual carriers through pooled 
reinsurance arrangements to limit soaring workers' 
compensation costs (Huber 86). Currently, the residual 
market is the single largest provider of workers' 
compensation insurance, with approximately 2 0% of total 
market (White, 1988) .
The makeup of the residual market is no longer small 
insureds who cannot afford to purchase coverage. Two-thirds 
of the residual market risks have premiums of over $500 
annually. Thirteen percent of these employers pay premiums 
in excess of $5,000 annually. Seventy five percent of the 
residual market premiums are $5000 or more annually. Tables 
5 and 6 detail the residual market makeup by number of risks 
in differing premium categories and premium dollars in 
differing premium categories. The inflow of new ARP 
applicants continues at an increasing rate.
14
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Table 5
PREMIUM SIZE PR O FILE-- 1 9 8 7  DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF RISKS
5.70% 1.30%
32.00%
32.80%
21.80%
Source: NCCI Digest July 1988. Volume III, Issue
□  $0— 1500 
O  $501--$1.000  
B  $1.001— $5.000 
S  $5.001— $10.000 
@  $10,001— $50.000 
■  $50.000 4
Table 6
PREMIUM SIZE PROFILE— 1987 DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL PREMIUM
7.10S iSOX
17.40*
Tssm
Source: NCCI Digest July 1988. Volume III. Issue
15
■  $0— $500 
a $501--$1,000  
QO $1 ,001--$5 .000  
B  $5,001--$10,000  
O  $10,001— $50,000 
□  $50,000 4
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Most disturbing is the growth in the residual market 
since 1984. In 1984 the residual market share was 5 1/2%. 
In 1988, four years later, few states have percentages that 
low (White, 1988). The national average among states for 
residual market is approximately 20%. Table 7 lists 
individual state's residual market shares which have WCIPs 
or ARPs.
Based on written premiums, the five largest categories
of insureds in the residual market are:
7219 Trucking and Drivers 
9079 Restaurant
8829 Convalescent or Nursing Home
564 5 Carpentry— Detached private residence
2702 Logging or Lumbering & Drivers
(Source: Management Summary Report, 1987, p.
18)
16
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Table 7
Percentage of Pools* Reinsured Premituns to 
NCCI-Reported Direct Workers Compensation Premiums 
Written Residual Market Share
State 1987 1986 1985 1984
Alabama 21.6% 18.4% 10. 8% 5.9%
Alaska 13.9% 15.9% 8.0% 4 . 0%
Arizona 2.4% 2.2% 0.7% 0.3%
Arkansas 26.5% 24.4% 11. 6% 3.4%
Connecticut 12,0% 9.8% 5.3% 3 . 4%
Delaware 6.7% 5.5% 2.7% 1.8%
District of Columbia 10.1% 9.8% 6.8% 3 . 6%
Florida 22 .2% 17.7% 10.4% 6.2%
Georgia 19.5% 16.7% 8.3% 3 . 0%
Hawaii 8.9% 7.8% 5,7% 3 . 6%
Illinois 17.8% 17.4% 11. 6% 5.3%
Indiana 22 . 6% 20.0% 9.9% 4.8%
Iowa 16.5% 14.5% 8.6% 2.7%
Kansas 24.5% 21.7% 12.9% 7.1%
Kentucky 20.9% 15.4% 10.7% 8 .1%
Louisiana 36.5% 33.2% 16.4% 8.0%
Maine 61.1% 54.6% 30.2% 20.4%
Massachusetts 25. 0% 20.4% 14.7% 10.4%
Michigan 11.7% 10.5% 6.8% 3.5%
Mississippi 25.7% 18.3% 10.5% 5.5%
Missouri 25.1% 23.9% 15.1% 7.6%
Nebraska 17.2% 16. 0% 7 . 6% 2.7%
New Hampshire 30.3% 24. 6% 14.9% 12 . 2%
New Jersey 9.2% 8.1% 4.0% 2 . 0%
New Mexico 30.2% 20.1% 7.3% 2.0%
North Carolina 15.4% 12 . 6% 8.1% 5.0%
Oregon 3.4% 3.6% 2 . 0% 0.5%
Rhode Island 44.4% 36.8% 22.8% 14.4%
South Carolina 19.2% 16.5% 8.7% 5.7%
South Dakota 25.2% 28.0% 11. 0% 4.8%
Tennessee 22.2% 19.2% 11. 0% 5.7%
Vermont 29.8% 26.8% 17.3% 14 .8%
Virginia 11. 6% 9.6% 4,8% 3.7%
Totals 18.9% 16.3% 9.7% 5.5%
Source: NCCI, Management Summary
1987
17
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Reasons for Growth of Residual Markets
According to Huber, growth in the residual market is 
the consequence of inadequate rates. State regulatory 
agencies regulate the rate process for workers' compensation 
to protect against massive workers' compensation rate 
adjustments. Rate changes are subject to rate filings from 
the NCCI or other rating bureaus. Approval of rate filings 
must come from the state's administered pricing process.
This process tends to eliminate violent swings in the 
product price (Huber, 198 6) .
Workers' compensation is in an adverse position. The 
cost of expected losses is hard to predict because of the 
uncertainty of dollar losses related to:
1) stress related emotional injuries
2) magnitude of occupational disease
3) erosion of exclusive remedy
4) ongoing liberalization of the definition of
compensable injuries and diseases (Huber, 1986).
ARPs increase underwriting losses. The plans remove the 
problem of insurance availability (McIntyre, 1987).
Residual markets, without rate differentials from the 
voluntary market, do not provide incentives for employers to 
develop and improve the workplace or frequency of losses. 
Risks are not moving from the involuntary market to the 
voluntary market (McIntyre, 1987). The lack of movement 
puts the residual market in competition with the voluntary 
market and undermines pricing (McIntyre, 1987 and Huber,
198 6). Huber noted efforts to obtain regulatory approval
18
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for rate differential in the residual market and the 
voluntary market have been generally unsuccessful.
Risks in the residual market receive discounts or 
manual premiums prices without regard for the experience 
rated system. Experience rating is part of the overall 
workers' compensation insurance pricing program. Under an 
experience rated plan, the manual rate is adjusted upward or 
downward based on past loss experience (Rejda, 1986). 
Combining the experience rated system with discounts or 
manual premiums in the residual market renders the 
experience rated plan pointless (Huber, 1986).
The growth in the residual markets and National Pool is 
a result of rate inadequacies, a decline in interest rates, 
and the reluctance of carriers to assume workers' 
compensation risks (Eisenberg and Vieweg, 1987). Workers' 
compensation costs rise annually as the system is asked to 
compensate for more injuries because courts expand the 
definition of compensable injuries. Increasing medical costs 
account for 40% of the claim dollar (Cain, 1987). The state 
of Maine exemplifies a high benefit system with inadequate 
rates. Eighty-five percent of the employers in Maine 
purchase insurance from the ARP. Maine has the highest 
residual market share in the United States (Cain, 1987).
The 1988 NCCI data for Maine shows more than 80% of the 
workers' compensation premium dollars are written in the 
residual market.
19
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Residual Market Costs
Workers' compensation insurance rates are based on 
insurers' total underwriting experience, including ARPs. 
Total premiums are expected to be adequate to cover all 
losses in the voluntary and involuntary markets (Mclntryre,
1987). The 1987 residual market burden is at 12%. For 
every dollar written in the voluntary market twelve cents 
goes to assist the residual market operating loss. This 
residual market burden has increased from 3.7% in 1979 to 7% 
in 1984 to the recent high of 12% in 1987 (White, 1988).
The 1989 NCCI Issues Report documents operating losses in 
the residual market in excess of $4.4 billion for the years 
1984 through 1988. These losses must be borne by the 
voluntary market.
The residual market burden varies by state. The burden 
(percentage support of the voluntary market premiums) ranges 
from more than 20% in Maine, Rhode Island, and Louisiana to 
less than 10% in Oregon, Arizona, and Delaware (White,
1988). Insurers pass the cost of the residual market losses 
onto other policyholders in the voluntary market in the form 
of higher premiums. The large increase in the WCIPs or ARPs 
results in increased losses and uncollected accounts. These 
losses are transferred to the voluntary market. The 
residual market rate is effectively the maximum price rate 
in the voluntary market. If assigned risk rates are set too 
low, the voluntary market will never cover the cost of
20
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
benefits under workers' compensation programs (Eisenberg and 
Vieweg, 1987 and McIntyre, 1987).
Kevin M. Ryan, President of NCCI in New York does not 
see workers' compensation insurance as a profitable line in 
the near future. He feels loss reserves are understated and 
rates are inadequate. Until workers' compensation becomes 
profitable, new insurers will not enter the market to write 
the line and ARP will continue to grow, thus increasing the 
residual market burden (McIntyre, 1987). Workers* 
compensation is becoming crippled with a shrinking number of 
insurance carriers willing to write workers' compensation. 
Many carriers stay in the workers' compensation line because 
of national accounts which demand broad based insurance 
coverage of many lines, workers' compensation being one of 
the lines. A withdrawal of workers' compensation may risk 
the loss of a national account. Insurance companies 
continue writing unprofitable workers' compensation to be 
competitive as a multi-line insurance provider (Cain, 198 6).
Insurance companies demonstrate good business behavior 
by extending coverage only to profitable risks. Viability 
of both the voluntary and residual markets become threatened 
due to rate inadequacy. Competitive pressures force 
insurers out of the workers' compensation line of business 
and out of states which do not provide adequate returns 
(Eisenberg and Vieweg, 1987) . Subsidizing the residual 
market through the voluntary market will only add to the
21
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decay of the workers’ compensation line of business (Huber, 
1986).
Control Mechanisms for Residual Markets
The strength of the residual market mechanism rests in 
its ability to adjust to the volatile voluntary market. The 
mechanism can work only if rate adequacy is achieved and if 
there is a restoration of rate differentials. The rate 
differentials must reflect the residual character of the 
business and remove the ARP from competition with the 
voluntary market (Huber, 1986).
A number of states are attempting to obtain regulatory 
approval for rate differentials between the voluntary and 
residual markets. Some states want to change the rating 
system used by ARPs. The changes would provide incentives 
for the insureds in the residual market to aggressively 
pursue loss control efforts to secure coverage in the 
voluntary market (Eisenber and Vieweg, 1987 and White,
1988). Changes suggested include: 1) use of a surcharge on 
premiums based on ARP experience, 2) removal of premium 
discounts offered to larger premium assigned risks and 3) 
establishing retrospective rated plans (Eisenber and Vieweg, 
1987, McIntyre, 1987 and White, 1988). Under a 
retrospective rating plan, the insured’s loss experience 
during a current policy period determines the actual premium 
to be paid for the period. The insured is charged a minimum 
or maximum premium. If actual losses are small, a minimum
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premium is paid; if losses are large, maximum premium is
paid (Rejda, 1986).
According to Zinkewicz, six states subjected their
residual market to large premium increases in 1987 and
expect to see a decline in their assigned risk population.
Residual market premium increases include :
Oregon: 464% Illinois: 213%
New Mexico: 350% Arizona: 178%
Georgia: 263% Iowa: 243%
Individual state residual market share percentages are
shown for 1985 through 1987 in Table 7.
Summary of Residual Market Literature
Information regarding the residual market of workers'
compensation is generated primarily from one source. The
source is the National Council of Compensation Insurance
(NCCI), the primary rate setting association for workers'
compensation insurance.
Availability of workers' compensation insurance is
guaranteed by either a workers' compensation insurance plan
(WCIP)/Assigned Risk Plan or a state fund approach. NCCI
manages or administers 67% of the 3 6 ARPs and another 25% of
the ARPs are modeled after NCCI plans. The current
literature available regarding workers' compensation
residual markets is either published by NCCI, or authors
have referenced sources from NCCI.
The residual market documented by ARP states has been
growing since 1984 at a rapid rate. The residual market is
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presently the largest insurer of workers' compensation and 
represents approximately 2 0% of the premium dollars written 
in ARP states. In 1984 the residual market share 
represented 5.5% of the total premium dollars written in ARP 
states. Literature was unavailable to document the state 
fund residual market mechanism. Concern for the workers' 
compensation industry centers on rate inadequacy and the 
burden the rate inadequacy creates. Both the voluntary 
market and the insurance companies have been absorbing the 
high costs of the residual market.
Rate differentials have been proposed and enacted by 
some states in an attempt to shift the burden of "poor 
experience" onto the risks responsible for the losses. Rate 
differentials encourage residual market risks, through 
higher premiums, to enact and control loss experiences to 
qualify for insurance in the voluntary market. Rate 
differentials will eliminate competition with the voluntary 
market. Huber contends the short-term remedy for 
availability of competitive private insurers must consist of 
rate increases. Affordability may be sacrificed. Huber 
suggests the long-term remedies for the troubled industry 
include limitations on attorneys' fees, coverage amounts, 
exposures, coverage interpretations, policy aggregates, and 
loss reporting.
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CHAPTER III 
DATA COLLECTION AND FINAL MODEL
Data Collection
The National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) 
is the rate-making body for the workers' compensation for 
individual states and the primary administrator of Assigned 
Risk Plans (ARPs). NCCI administers 24 of the 35 state 
ARPs, and 9 other states follow NCCI plan procedures. Thus, 
NCCI became the major supplier of information for the 
statistical model.
Analysis of competitive state fund states which did not 
have an ARP was also attempted. California, New York, and 
Pennsylvania were contacted to obtain information similar to 
data requested with the APR states administered by NCCI. 
These state compensation funds and rating bureaus were 
helpful; however, it became impossible to quantify an 
involuntary or residual market (RM) in those states due to 
the basic characteristic of a state fund. This 
characteristic, being an insurer of last resort, provides no 
mechanism for tracking businesses who have had insurance 
refused in the private sector.
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NCCI provided secondary data from published reports and 
computerized data banks. The statistical model was built 
using 1988 NCCI data.
Variable Selection
Review of the published material from NCCI revealed the 
following factors expected to affect the size of the ARP 
market or residual market.
Variable Name 
# of risks in RM
Prem. $/Rate 9079
Prem. $/Rate 7219
Prem. $/Rate 8829
Prem. $/Rate 5645
Prem. $/Rate 8833
Prem. $/Rate 2702
Variable Definition 
The number of employers 
(risks) which make up the 
residual market or involuntary 
market.
The premium dollars and manual 
rates per hundred for the 1988 
governing class code 9079 
restaurant for the residual 
market.
The premium dollars and manual 
rates per hundred for the 1988 
governing class code 7219 
trucking for the residual 
market.
The premium dollars and manual 
rates per hundred for the 1988 
governing class code 882 9 
nursing home for the residual 
market
The premium dollars and manual 
rates per hundred for the 1988 
governing class code 5645 
carpentry for the residual 
market.
The premium dollars and manual 
rates per hundred for the 1988 
governing class code 8833 
hospital for the residual 
market.
The premium dollars and manual 
rates per hundred for the 1988
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governing class code 2702 logging for the residual 
market.
Surcharge The rate differentials in the 
ARP states.
Inc. C.C. Prem.
# of Carriers
# of Servicing Carriers
Loss Ratio
Change in risks
Underwriting +/-
The class codes which showed 
significant premium dollar 
changes in the residual 
market.
The number of insurance 
carriers writing workers 
compensation in assigned risk 
states.
The number of servicing 
carriers used to write 
insurance for the state ARP.
The ratio of premiums written 
to incurred losses in the 
residual market for assigned 
risk states.
The change in the number of 
risks in the residual market 
from 1987 to 1988 in assigned 
risk states.
The amount of underwriting 
gain (loss) in the residual 
market of ARP states.
The variables were selected because:
1) # of risks in the residual market - The research 
literature documented a growth in the residual market by the 
premium "size of businesses" who comprise the RM. In 1987 
over 4 5% of the RM for assigned risk states was comprised of 
businesses with yearly premiums over $1000. Residual market 
risks are no longer just the small business owner.
2) Premium $/Rate - This represents the six major class 
codes in the RM of ARP states. These class codes of 
restaurant, trucking, nursing home, carpentry, hospital, and 
logging represent significant industries in Montana. These 
variables were tested using both total premiums in the RM 
and the premium rates per hundred.
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3) Surcharge - The research literature found that escalating 
market premiums were resulting because of lack of rate 
differentials. Without rate differentials there is no 
incentive for the risks to move from the involuntary or RM 
to the voluntary market.
4) Increase in Class Code Premiums - This variable was 
considered because state agencies regulate class code 
premiums. It was hypothesized that class codes which showed 
significant premium dollar changes were potential class 
codes with rates which were too low. The assumption was, 
the maximum rate increase requested by the rating bureau is 
never adopted by the regulatory agency.
5) # of Carriers - This variable appeared relevant to 
investigate if greater numbers of insurance providers affect 
the size of the residual market.
6) # of Servicing Carriers - This variable was considered 
because of the relatively few insurance carriers writing 
significant premium levels of workers' compensation 
insurance in Montana. Most ARP states have hundreds of 
carriers with six or fewer designated at servicing carriers. 
Would all major carriers have to be servicing carriers and 
would the carriers agree to this?
7) Loss Ratio - This ratio tests to see if the size of the 
RM is related to the profitability of this market.
8) Change in risks - This variable looks at the percentage 
change in number of risks in the RM from one year to the 
next. The literature suggests that it is difficult for 
firms to move from the RM to the voluntary market.
(9) Underwriting +/- - The variable was similar to the
loss ratio but the dollar +/- figure gave an absolute 
specific cost figure.
The Model
The size of the residual market in Montana was examined 
by; 1) first estimating the relationship between the RM and 
the above factors in 31 states with existing ARPs and 2) 
then assuming this same relationship exists in Montana.
28
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The relationship was estimated using regression 
analysis. The relative size of the residual market is the 
dependent variable, the phenomenon to be explained. The 
factors or independent variables explain the size of the RM. 
Regression analysis is used to derive the exact equation 
between the independent and dependent variables. The final 
form of this regression model was determined using a 
backward step procedure. That is, the initial nine 
independent variables described and detailed in Table 10 
were reduced to four by sequentially eliminating the 
variable with the least statistical significance.
The backward step regression procedure is illustrated 
in Table 8. The variable with the least statistical 
significance (the lowest "t” statistic) is eliminated at 
each step, and the regression is recalculated. High "t" 
statistics are associated with independent variables which 
make a significant contribution to the model. The backward 
step procedure chooses the subset of independent variable 
that can "explain" most of the variation in the dependent 
variable. The final model is shown in step 6; it contains 
four independent variables, each significant at the .10 
level ("t" statistic). The final model has two very 
significant independent variables contributing to the 
prediction of the size of the residual market. They are 
hospital class code rates (t = -2.86) and underwriting 
gain/loss (t = -4.21). The "t" statistics for logging class
29
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codes and percentage of increase/decrease in risks are 
slightly lower, at 1.8 and 1.6 respectively. The backward 
step procedure reduced the number of independent variables 
from nine to four with less than a .05 reduction in the R  ̂
(.532 - .486 = .46).
Table 8
Backward Step Regression Process for Final Model 
Elimination of Lowest T Statistic
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6
Variable T-Stat T-Stat T-Stat T-Stat T-Stat T-Stat
Restrnt -0.32*
Truck 0.72 0.78 0. 64*
N ur.Home 0.85 0. 80 0.80 0.92*
Carpentry -1.24 -1.41 -1.35 -1.23 -0.83*
Hospital -1.18 -1. 44 -1. 44 -1.32 — 1. 15 -2 . 86
Logging 1.85 1. 87 1.97 2 . 06 1. 85 1.83
+/-Risks 1. 37 1.52 1.48 1.41 1.28 1. 63
Surcharge -0.37 -0.48*
+/- Undrwrtg -3 . 65 -3 . 97 -4 . 01 -4 . 11 -4 . 16 -4 .21
R ̂ per step .532 . 529 .525 .516 . 499 .486
♦Variable being eliminated
The regression coefficients for the final model are 
detailed in Exhibit 9. Beneath each regression coefficient 
is the standard error and the **t” ratio.
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Table 9
Estimated Regression Coefficients for the Final Model
Inc/Dec
Constant Hospital Loaaina Risks Undr G/L R  ̂ Sard
.194 -0.0988 0.0022 0.4750 -.14x10 .4856
(.116) (.0346) (.0012) (.2907) (.0000)
-2.8578 1.8308 1.6339 -4.2094
Note: Below each coefficient is the standard error and "t”
ratio.
The regression coefficient is the change in the 
dependent variable associated with a one unit change in the 
independent variable. The sign of the coefficient indicates 
a positive (direct) or negative (inverse) relationship 
between the independent and dependent variable.
The final model has three of the four independent 
variables with hypothesized coefficient signs. Signs which 
denoted the appropriate relationship between the independent 
variable and the dependent variable. Logging (+) positive 
coefficient implies that high manual rates are associated 
with larger RM premium dollars. The underwriting (-) 
negative coefficient sign implies that significant losses in 
the RM are also associated with larger increases to the size 
of the RM. The percentage of risks increase/decrease (+) 
coefficient sign means, as the number of risks entering the 
RM increases, so does the share of the RM. The hospital
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independent variable coefficient sign was negative. This 
suggests that higher rates for this category were associated 
with smaller values for the size of the RM. The hospital 
class code negative coefficient gave evidence to 
multicollinearity in the model, a sign that correlation does 
exist between the independent variables.
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CHAPTER IV 
IMPLICATIONS, CONCERNS AND SUMMARY
Implications of Model Results for Montana
The statistical model produced four variables which 
explained 49% of the variation in the RM of 31 Assigned Risk 
Plan (ARP) states. The model is a tool to aid in the 
understanding of factors which can significantly influence 
the size of a residual market. Two of the four variables, 
hospital and logging manual rates per hundred, are of 
special consequence to Montana. Logging and hospitals 
represent two major industries in Montana. It is important 
to note that logging rates in Montana may have been held 
down by past lobbying efforts at the legislative level by 
the logging industry.
Inadequate rates cause continued losses. The residual 
market grows by the inability of businesses to purchase 
insurance in the voluntary market. Inadequate minimum 
premiums cause businesses to be routinely serviced through 
ARPs. The residual market grows by the inability of the 
risks in the ARP to exit to the voluntary workers' 
compensation market. The model denotes the significance of
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
inadequate rates by the variable underwriting losses. 
Significant losses in the residual market are associated 
with larger increases to the size of the residual market 
when applied to the model. Literature suggests that ARPs 
must apply rate differentials in the form of surcharges 
which are an additional 10-50% above the manual rate. Rate 
differentials are necessary to motivate risks to move from 
the residual market to the voluntary market by improved loss 
control measures. The variable which measures increase or 
decrease in percentage change of risks in the residual 
market verifies the significance of ARP risks being able to 
move to the voluntary market. The model denotes as more 
risks enter the residual market, the size of the residual 
market grows by the new entrants and the inability of 
existing risks to leave.
Concerns and Summarv
How big will the assigned risk category be for Montana 
in terms of total premium dollars? The model can be used to 
predict the size of the RM if the four independent variables 
are defined for Montana. The rate per hundred for the 
governing class codes of logging and hospitals are easily 
obtained. The last two variables require a definition of 
premium dollar gains/losses and number of risks in Montana's 
RM. Because the last two independent variables require 
assumptions, it becomes difficult to use the model as a 
predictor of potential RM size for an ARP.
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The model is an excellent assessment of variables which 
have significant impact on the movement or size of the RM. 
The statistical model, using four independent variables, 
explained 49% of the movement or size of the RM in the 31 
ARP states. In this capacity, the model justifies attention 
to rates in the hospital and logging industry. The model 
warrants attention to the underwriting experience of the RM 
and the number of risks in the RM. These two independent 
variables, underwriting experience and number of risks, 
support the concerns in the RM literature for adequate rate 
differentials to encourage businesses to exit the RM through 
improved loss control measures. In conclusion, the model 
defines four independent variables or areas for concern that 
are worthy of attention in Montana.
The ARP mechanism must be carefully evaluated for its 
intent. If the purpose is to spread the "poor risks" 
because of rate inadequacy and liberal state statutes, then 
the problem has not been solved but simply passed to all 
insurers of workers compensation and thus passed to all 
insureds in the voluntary market. If the intent is to 
subsidize affordability and guarantee availability of 
workers' compensation through a mechanism which impacts all 
workers* compensation carriers and risks, the ARP represents 
an excellent vehicle. However, is the price of 
affordability and availability giving the employee a safe 
working environment? Workers' compensation insurance was
35
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created to guarantee employee's medical and wage loss 
benefits in exchange for protection against employer 
liability and tort. Insurance premiums were to act as the 
motivator for safe working environments. A question for 
further study should be "What are the motivators for 
business to provide safe work environments?"
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TABLE 10 
Muliipla Ragresskm Model
ARP
Res.
Mrk. 9079
States 1988 Rstnt
Alabama 22.4% 3.45
Alaska 15.1% 4.69
Arizona 1.7% 4.22
Arkansas 22.5% 2.54
Conneticut 11.1% 2.56
Dist. of Col. 9.7% 3.06
Florida 21.0% 5.84
Georgia 16.2% 4.46
Hawaii 9.5% 4.59
Illinois 15.2% 2.96
Indiana 20.3% 1.41
Iowa 17.2% 1.78
Kansas 21.7% 2.22
Kentucky 21.1% 2.56
Louisiana 43.3% 4.04
Maine 32.2% 2.38
Massachusett 29.5% 3.17
Mississippi 28.2% 3.00
Missouri 25.2% 2.73
Nebraska 17.9% 1.50
New Hampshi 26.4% 2.02
New Jersey 9.6% 2.86
New Mexico 31.1% 4.78
North Carolina 16.2% 1.79
Oregon 3.3% 6.83
Rhode Island 51.5% 3.34
South Carolin 20.8% 2.50
South Dakota 27.4% 1.89
Tennessee 23.3% 2.77
Vermont 27.4% 1.87
Virginia 12.4% 1.86
UndarwrtIIng Sur-
Constant
SId Err of Y Est
R Squared
No. of Observations
Degrees of Freedom
X Coefficient(s)
Sid Err of Cœf.
T  Statistic
Restrnt.
-0.01680
0.052776
-0.32
7219
Truck
10.38
20.02
13.97
11,00
11.73 
15.13
17.43 
9.70
16.68
13.57
4.16
9.87
9.33
11.73 
10.65
12.43 
11.60
8.47
9.14
6.60
12.55
9.03
16.53
6.06
23.46
3.41
3.61
10.17
5.49
6.10
7.00
0.185992
0.123498
0.532137
31
21
Trucking
0.009131
0.012613
0.72
1829 5645 8833 2702 Gain/Loss %  Inc/Oe Charge
rs.Hm. Carpentry Hôpital Logging 1988 No. Risk States
5.27 10.99 1.37 27.93 ($37,725,128) 3.87% 0
8.33 17.16 2.19 45.58 $5,661,854 15.10% 1
9.04 16.37 295 19.60 ($1.907,647) 28.27% 1
4.80 10.19 1.29 37.12 ($19,459,540) 1.35% 0
5.71 9.35 1.47 41.01 ($22,073,997) 10.85% 0
4.88 11.95 1.57 66.72 ($862,599) -2.52% 1
9.46 18.56 2.85 20.81 ($228.703,669) 7.40% 1
6.87 1296 1.40 29.19 ($50,908,983) -2.86% 1
6.20 21.01 3.42 129.41 $721,706 8.20% 0
4.62 11.36 1.24 30.32 ($67,703,746) 6.99% 1
Z18 5.03 0.34 13.30 ($28,486,333) 6.07% 0
2.99 6.71 0.74 28.43 ($19.155,760) 9.41% 1
3.28 9.08 0.91 19.37 ($13,061,771) -3.93% 0
5.71 9.35 1.47 41.01 ($2.458,648) 3.51% 1
6.27 9.93 1.05 4229 ($201,803,701) 9.85% 1
4.05 8.63 1.22 . 35.52 ($181.834,283) 11.29% 1
4.99 12.98 2.00 29.98 ($220.717,169) 13.78% 0
4.15 8.16 0.94 30.50 ($28.288,484) 9.18% 0
4.06 6.38 1.12 27.73 ($42,546,564) 5.14% 0
244 5.77 0.74 14.48 ($10,794,828) 17.47% 1
4.87 10.48 1.41 29.23 ($10,104,285) 5.96% 0
3.57 7.08 1.47 25.22 ($29,942,370) -3.88% 0
5.61 14.37 259 41.88 ($39,174,428) 15.43% 1
2.26 6.00 0.79 17.08 ($19,234,367) 1.94% 1
16.78 32.07 277 44.49 ($8,904,952) -3.26% 0
5.28 10.63 1.71 62.83 ($62,393.234) 20.46% 0
2.97 14.24 0.89 46.12 ($21,669,977) 13.84% 0
3.37 7.07 0.94 30.32 ($5.645,834) 8.19% 1
5.57 8.37 1.00 26.22 ($42.106,608) 6.04% 0
4.05 7.52 1.55 19.23 ($1.974,943) 12.18% 0
2.44 7.17 0.68 18.63 ($20,280,415) 14.75% 0
Nurs.Hm Carpentry Hospital 
0.019833 -0.01674 -0.07971 
0.023452 0.013542 0.067274 
0.85 -1.24 -1.18
Logging
0.002740
0.0014790176
1.85
Underwriting
-0.0000000014
0.0000000004
-3.65
Risks +/ 
0.477794 
0 348901 
1.37
Surctiarge
-0.02069
0.055812
-0.37
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TABLE 11 
Optimum Model
ARP
States 1988
Multiple Regression Model
8833 2702 %lnc/Dc 
Hospital Logging No. Risk
Underwriting
Gain/Loss
1988
Alabama 22.4% 1.37 27.93 3.87% ($37,725,128)
Alaska 15.1% 2.19 45.58 15.10% $5,661,854
Arizona 1.7% 2.95 19.60 28.27% ($1,907,647)
Arkansas 22.5% 1.29 37.12 1.35% ($19,459,540)
Conneticut 11.1% 1.47 41.01 10.85% ($22,073,997)
Dist. of Col. 9.7% 1.57 66.72 -2 .52% ($862,599)
Florida 21.0% 2.85 20.81 7.40% ($228,703,669)
Georgia 16.2% 1.40 29.19 -2 .86% ($50,908,983)
Hawaii 9.5% 3.42 129.41 8.20% $721,706
Illinois 15.2% 1.24 30.32 6.99% ($67,703,746)
Indiana 20.3% 0.34 13.30 6.07% ($28,486,333)
Iowa 17.2% 0.74 28.43 9.41% ($19,155,760)
Kansas 21.7% 0.91 19.37 -3.93% ($13,061,771)
Kentucky 21.1% 1.47 41.01 3.51% ($2,458,648)
Louisiana 43.3% 1.05 42.29 9.85% ($201,803,701)
Maine 82.2% 1.22 35.52 11.29% ($181,834,283)
Massachusetts 29.5% 2.00 29.98 13.78% ($220,717,169)
Mississippi 28.2% 0.94 30.50 9.18% ($28,288,484)
Missouri 25.2% 1.12 27.73 5.14% ($42,546,564)
Nebraska 17.9% 0.74 14.48 17.47% ($10,794,828)
New Hampshire 26.4% 1.41 29.23 5.96% ($10,104,285)
New Jersey 9.6% 1.47 25.22 -3.88% ($29,942,370)
New Mexico 31.1% 2.59 41.88 15.43% ($39,174,428)
North Carolina 16.2% 0.79 17.08 1.94% ($19,234,867)
Oregon 3.3% 2.77 44.49 -3.26% ($8,904,952)
Rhode Island 51.5% 1.71 62.83 20.46% ($62,393,234)
South Carolina 20.8% 0.89 46.12 13.84% ($21,669,977)
South Dakota 27.4% 0.94 30.32 8.19% ($5,645,834)
Tennessee 23.3% 1.00 26.22 6.04% ($42,106,608)
Vermont 27.4% 1.55 19.23 12.18% ($1.974,943)
Virginia 12.4% 0.68 18.63 14.75% ($20,280,415)
Regression Output:
Constant
Std Err of Y  Est
R Squared
No. of Observations
Degrees of Freedom
X Coefficient(s)
Std Err of Coef.
T Statistic
Hospital
-0,09878
0.03456513
-2.8578714
0.194033 
0.116382 
0.485576 
31 
26 
Logging 
0.002164 
0.001182 
1.830813
Risks + /- 
0.47504839 
0.29073445 
1.63395974
Underwriting
-0.0000000014
0.0000000003
-4.2093819752
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